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The cyclical behaviour of European bank capital 
buffers 
Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 17/2006 
Terhi Jokipii – Alistair Milne 




Using an unbalanced panel of commercial, savings and co-operative banks for the 
years 1997 to 2004 we examine the cyclical behaviour of European bank capital 
buffers. After controlling for other potential determinants of bank capital, we find 
that capital buffers of the banks in the accession countries (RAM) have a 
significant positive relationship with the cycle, while for those in the EU15 and 
the EA and the combined EU25 the relationship is significantly negative. We 
additionally find fairly slow speeds of adjustment, with around two-thirds of the 
correction towards desired capital buffers taking place each year. We further 
distinguish by type and size of bank, and find that capital buffers of commercial 
and savings banks, and also of a sub-sample of large banks, exhibit negative co-
movement. Co-operative banks and smaller banks on the other hand, tend to 
exhibit positive cyclical co-movement. 
 
Key words: bank capital, bank regulation, business cycle fluctuations 
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Pankkien pääomapuskureiden suhdannedynamiikka 
Euroopassa 
Suomen Pankin tutkimus 
Keskustelualoitteita 17/2006 
Terhi Jokipii – Alistair Milne 




Tässä työssä tarkastellaan pankkien pääomapuskureiden suhdannedynamiikkaa 
eurooppalaisten liike-, säästö- ja osuuspankkien muodostamassa ajanjakson 1997–
2004 kattavassa vuositason paneeliaineistossa. Kun estimoitavassa mallissa kont-
rolloidaan muut mahdolliset pankin pääomaa määräävät tekijät, vaihtelevat pank-
kien pääomapuskureiden määrä estimointitulosten mukaan suhdanteita myötäillen 
uusissa Euroopan Yhteisön jäsenmaissa. Kaikkien 25 ja 15 vanhemman Euroopan 
Yhteisön sekä euroalueen jäsenmaat käsittävissä aineistoissa pankkien pääoma-
puskurien määrä ja suhdannevaihtelut korreloivat negatiivisesti. Pääomapuskurei-
den sopeutuminen tavoitetasolleen on lisäksi tulosten mukaan suhteellisen hidasta, 
sillä poikkeamista kaksi kolmasosaa korjaantuu vuoden aikana. Kun pankit luoki-
tellaan tyypin ja koon mukaan, niin tulokset viittaavat siihen, että liike- ja 
säästöpankkien samoin kuin suurten pankkien pääomapuskurien muutokset ovat 
erisuuntaisia. Osuuspankkien samoin kuin pienten pankkien pääomapuskurit sen 
sijaan muuttuvat talouden suhdanteittain samansuuntaisesti. 
 
Avainsanat: pankin oma pääoma, pankkien sääntely, suhdannevaihtelut 
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Several instruments are used to regulate banking institutions, the most prominent 
taking the form of the capital requirement regulation. As imposed by the 1988 
Basel Capital Accord and its subsequent amendments, the regulation requires that 
banks hold a minimum amount of capital equal to eight percent of its risk-
weighted assets. An updated version of the Capital Accord, Basel II, will come 
into force in 2007 with the objective of bringing bank capital requirements more 
in line with actual risks. The move towards increased risk-sensitivity in the bank 
capital requirements under Basel II, has sparked a debate relating to a ‘pro-
cyclicality’ issue, whereby capital requirements have the potential to amplify the 
business cycle. There have been widespread concerns that the Basel II regime will 
raise bank capital requirements in business cycle recessions, hence constraining 
bank lending and potentially leading to loan foreclosures and falls in loan 
collateral values.
1 
  Much of the work analysing the extent to which the ‘pro-cyclicality’ issue 
may arise with the introduction of Basel II, has however failed to consider that 
most banks hold capital to a large degree in excess of that required by the 
regulators (see for example Berger and Udell, 1994; Berger, 1995; Kwan and 
Eisenbeis, 1997; Jackson, 1999; Furfine, 2000). This is clearly apparent in the 
data we use for this paper. Table 1, discussed in detail in Section 3, highlights the 
fact that on average, banks operating in Europe hold a capital ratio in the region of 
three percentage points above that required of them. 
  Recent empirical literature in this field has hence become concerned with 
under-standing the determinants of this excess capital under the current accord in 
an attempt to shed some light on the possible implications of the introduction of 
the new framework (see Ediz et al, 1998; Rime, 2001; Ayuso et al, 2004; Bikker 
and Metzemakers, 2004; Estrella, 2004; Lindqvist, 2004; Stoltz and Wedow, 
2005). Many of these authors have concentrated on studying bank capitalization 
within a single country framework, the exception being Bikker and Metzemakers 
(2004), who perform a cross-country analysis on 29 OECD countries. A further 
gap in this literature stems from the inability of these studies to uncover 
significant evidence relating to capital buffer movements between different types 
or sizes of banks. 
 
                                                 
1 See among others BCBS (2001), Borio et al (2001), Daníelsson et al (2001), DNB (2001) and 
ECB (2001).  
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Table 1.   Capital buffers by country 
      (weighted by total assets) 
 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  avg 
AT  0.72 2.09 2.09 1.96 2.89 2.63 3.08 3.10  2.32 
BE  3.43 3.45 4.37 5.75 5.31 5.06 4.66 4.45  4.56 
FI  4.03 2.49 4.01 1.38 1.68 2.53  10.97  11.20  4.79 
FR  2.24 2.31 2.13 1.80 1.78 1.67 1.84 1.49  1.91 
DE  1.96 1.89 2.46 3.00 2.79 2.85 4.41 4.37  2.97 
GR  1.73 1.67 6.21 4.51 2.83 2.24 3.42 4.57  3.40 
IE  3.02 3.54 3.23 3.05 3.05 4.95 6.82 5.54  4.15 
IT  1.49 1.81 1.46 1.61 1.34 2.32 2.42 2.87  1.92 
LU  4.87 4.07 4.26 4.07 3.94 3.75 4.88 2.47  4.04 
NL  2.96 2.84 2.71 2.69 2.80 3.23 3.56 3.50  3.04 
PT  2.66 1.86 2.35 0.98 1.23 1.62 2.04 2.21  1.87 
ES  1.93 2.75 2.39 2.50 3.20 2.82 2.63 2.51  2.59 
DK  2.29 2.22 2.62 1.75 2.24 2.43 2.79 2.23  2.32 
SE  2.55 2.73 3.23 2.46 2.70 2.29 2.53 2.68  2.65 
UK  1.70 1.47 1.89 2.37 1.50 0.96 0.92 0.85  1.46 
CY  2.13 1.34 3.94 4.63 3.24 1.52 1.48 2.83  2.64 
CZ  2.09 3.79 4.81 6.13 4.03 3.94 4.43 2.74  4.00 
EE  3.23 8.57  10.55  7.53 6.84 6.55 5.18 4.01  6.56 
HU  4.51 4.73 7.32 6.88 3.27 4.68 2.27 1.96  4.45 
LAT  8.10 1.60 4.78 3.00 2.74 2.42 2.33 4.14  3.64 
LIT  2.23  15.40  3.12 3.79 4.49 4.81 1.97 2.28  4.76 
MAL  6.57 8.46 8.06 8.27 6.65 7.19 7.71 3.01  6.99 
PL  2.32 2.18 4.84 5.36 6.33 5.67 5.76 7.67  5.02 
SLK        5.36  10.14  12.05  9.18 
SLV  8.06 6.10 5.49 6.71 6.03 8.09 6.29 6.04  6.60 
EU25  3.20 3.72 4.10 3.84 3.45 3.66 4.18 4.03  3.77 
EU15  2.51 2.48 3.03 2.66 2.62 2.76 3.80 3.60  2.93 
EA  2.59 2.56 3.14 2.77 2.74 2.97 4.23 4.02  3.13 
DK-SE-UK  2.18 2.14 2.58 2.19 2.15 1.90 2.08 1.92  2.14 
RAM  4.36 5.80 5.88 5.81 4.85 5.02 4.75 4.67  5.14 
Note: AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, DE = Germany, ES = Spain, FI = Finland, FR = France, GR = 
Greece, IE = Ireland, IT = Italy, LU = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, PT = Portugal, DK = 
Denmark, SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom, CY = Cyprus, CZ = Czech Republic, EE = 
Estonia, HU = Hungary, LAT = Latvia, LIT = Lithuania, MAL = Malta, PL = Poland, SK = 
Slovakia, SL =Slovenia. 




Ayuso et al (2004) concentrate on a panel of Spanish savings and commercial 
banks, finding a robustly significant negative relationship between the cycle and 
the buffer. This negative relationship justifies the concerns raised relating to the 
possibility of increased pro-cyclicality under the new Accord since banks don’t 
appear to be accounting for mitigating risks during an economic upturn, building 
up capital buffers when it is cheaper and easier to do so. Lindqvist, (2004) 
estimates a similar model for Norwegian savings and commercial banks and find a 
similar negative effect. Bikker and Metzemakers (2004), analyse the buffer-cycle 
relationship for a set of OECD countries. Their analysis focuses on commercial 
banks only and uncovers a similar negative relationship. In their study on the 
buffer movements of German savings and co-operative banks over the cycle, 
Stoltz and Wedow (2005) separate their sample by type of bank. They find a 
similar negative effect to other authors in this field, but discover that the 
fluctuations appear to be stronger for savings banks than they are for commercial 
banks. 
  In this paper, we define the capital buffer as the amount of capital banks hold 
in excess of that required of them by the national regulator and examine the 
degree to which co-movement exists between the buffer and the cycle. We split 
the banks in our sample by countries – so as to obtain EU25, EU15, EA, 
Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom (DK-SE-UK) and RAM (countries 
that joined the EU in May 2004) sub-samples – and by bank type and size – to 
investigate differences in the buffer-cycle relationship. 
  Our estimation results reveal substantial differences in capital buffer 
behaviour in the various sub-groups. We find that capital buffers of RAM banks 
appear to move together with the business cycle while the buffers of banks 
operative in the EU25, EU15, DK-SE-UK and EA samples rather exhibit negative 
co-movement. Breaking the sample down further by size and type of bank, we 
find additional distinctions. Here, capital buffers of commercial and savings 
banks, as well as those of larger banks appear to have a negative relationship with 
the cycle while those of co-operative banks and of smaller banks move together 
with the cycle. On the other hand, in almost all cases, we find a fairly slow speed 
of adjustment towards desired capital buffers. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a short 
overview of bank regulation. Section 3 discusses the motivation for holding 
excess capital, sets out the hypotheses we test, and describes our data including 
the various controls we introduce for the non-cyclical determinants of bank 
capital. Section 4 presents our specification and empirical results together with 




2 Bank  regulation 
The combination of the potential instability of banking institutions, their complex 
nter-connections, and their important facilitating role in the economy justifies the 
detailed regulation of the banking sector. Various different instruments have been 
adopted for the regulation of the banking sector, including: the government safety 
net, restrictions on asset holdings, capital requirements, chartering and bank 
examination, disclosure requirements, consumer protection and various remedies 
to promote competition (Greenbaum and Thakor, 1995; Freixas and Rochet, 1997; 
Mishkin, 2000). 
  Capital regulation is one of the key regulatory instruments, aimed at providing 
both a ‘buffer’ during adverse economic conditions, as well as a mechanism 
aimed at preventing excessive risk taking ex ante (Rochet, 1992; Dewatripont and 
Tirole, 1993). Borrowings (including deposits) generate contractual liabilities, 
which, if not paid when due, can result in bank failure. Thus the greater the 
proportion of a bank’s operations that are financed with capital funds contributed 
by its owners, the higher the chance that the bank will continue to be able to pay 
its obligations during periods of economic adversity. 
  Moreover, in a largely leveraged firm, owners are able to reap the gains of 
success while shifting losses to the lenders via limited liability. Consequently, 
incentives for risk taking are significantly increased.
2 Since banks often times 
have capital structures with substantial amounts of debt, the possibility of such 
risk shifting behaviour in this sector is particularly problematic. Incentives for 
such bank moral hazard are exacerbated by the bank safety net, since depositors 
and debt-holders who believe that they will be supported, have relatively little 
incentive to monitor bank portfolio risks. 
  Current capital regulation, as implemented by the Basel Accord of 1988, 
applies to all internationally active banks. Over 100 countries to date have 
adopted the rules, most of which additionally require locally active banks to 
adhere to them. The capital adequacy ratio is set equal to eight percent of the 
banks’ risk weighted assets, and acts as an indicator of the banks’ ability to absorb 
losses. The numerator of the ratio comprises total capital which is a combination 
of tier one and tier two capital. Tier one capital refers to the banks core capital, 
including equity and disclosed reserves and can absorb losses without a bank 
being required to cease trading. The ratio of the banks’ tier one capital to risk-
weighted assets should be no less than four percent. Tier two capital on the other 
hand, relates to secondary bank capital, and includes items such as undisclosed 
reserves, general loss reserves and subordinated term debt. Tier two capital can 
                                                 
2 For a more detailed discussion of the risk shifting phenomenon in banking and the role of capital 
requirement regulation in mitigating this, see; Milgrom and Roberts 1992; Greenbaum and Thakor, 
1995 and Keeley, 1990.  
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absorb losses in the event of a winding-up and so provides a lesser degree of 
protection for depositors. The denominator of the ratio is obtained by multiplying 
assets by a pre-defined weighting coefficient.
3 
  The capital regulation rules, as outlined above, are a minimum to be 
implemented by the individual supervisory authorities with the aim of creating a 
level playing field for market operatives, as well as for ensuring a sound and 
stable financial environment. Several of the supervisory authorities acting in the 
countries within our sample have, for various reasons, either set capital ratios 
above those recommended by the Accord, or, alternatively, supplemented the 
rules with a range of additional requirements. Table 2 presents the implementation 
of the minimum capital requirements adopted by the national regulators of the 
countries in our sample. Further individual country measures are outlined in 
Annex 1. 
 
Table 2.   National Tier 2 capital Requirements 
 






UK 9%*  1979   
CY 8%  1997   
 10% 2001  changes  in market structure 
CZ 8%  1992   
EE  10%  1997  rapid growth of bank assets and a change in 
operating environment 
HU 8%  1991   
LAT 10%  1997   
 8% 2004   
LIT 10%  1997   
 8% 2005   
MAL 8%  1994  
PL 8%  1992   
SK 8%  1997   
SL 8%  2002   
Note: *As explained in Appendix I, the FSA sets additional ‘trigger’ and ‘higher target’ ratios for 
UK banks resulting in higher levels of capital required by the regulators. For this reason in the 
study we apply a 9% requirement to UK banks active in the sample and calculate the buffer as 
capital above  this level. 
AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, DE = Germany, ES = Spain, FI = Finland, FR = France, GR = 
Greece, IE = Ireland, IT = Italy, LU = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, PT = Portugal, DK = 
Denmark, SE = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom, CY = Cyprus, CZ = Czech Republic, EE = 
Estonia, HU = Hungary, LAT = Latvia, LIT = Lithuania, MAL = Malta, PL = Poland, SK = 
Slovakia, SL = Slovenia. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Under the Basel I Accord, four risk buckets are set: 0 per cent for claims on central governments; 
20 per cent for claims on other banks; 50 per cent for loans secured by residential property and 100 
per cent for claims on private sector. Further risk-weights are applied to off-balance sheet 
exposures.  
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  Since its implementation in 1988, The Basel Accord has helped to strengthen 
the soundness and the stability of the international banking system as a result of 
the higher capital ratios that it required. The revised version of the Capital 
Regulations (Basel II), to be implemented by 2007, aims to bring the framework 
more in line with modern banking by becoming more risk-sensitive and 
representative of current risk management practices. There are several 
components to the new framework. First, it is more sensitive to the risks that firms 
face: the new framework includes an explicit measure for operational risk and 
additionally updates the existing weightings that exist against credit risk. Under 
the standardised approach, banks will be permitted to make use of external ratings 
by acknowledged ratings agencies; introducing differing weight coefficients for 
counterparties distinct from the set risk buckets defined under Basel I. Risk 
coefficients for enterprises under Basel II, will range between 20 and 150 percent 
depending on the risk involved. 
  The Accord further reflects improvements in firms' risk management 
practices, for example by the introduction of the internal ratings based approach 
(IRB) for credit risk. The IRB approach will allow firms to rely, to a certain 
extent, on their own internal estimations of default probabilities and of loss given 
default. Risk coefficients here have the potential to be even more risk sensitive 
than under the standardized approach, with coefficients ranging between 3 and 
600 percent, depending on the perceived riskiness of the counterparty (BIS, 2002). 
  Much of the debate surrounding Basel II has focused on the potential 
cyclicality effects that could arise from the adoption of the new framework. Since 
one of the primary aims of the new Accord is to create a closer link between 
capital requirements and risks, it is clear that these requirements will subsequently 
become more dependent on the business cycle. In a cyclical downturn, when 
counterparties are more likely to be downgraded than upgraded, the resultant 
effect under the standardized approach could be a significant increase in the 
capital requirements to account for increased counterparty risk. Similarly, during 
an economic upturn, when rating agencies are likely to increase the number of 
upgrades made, the amount of capital required would be reduced. Since raising 
capital is costly, especially during an economic recession when profits are 
decreasing, banks might be forced to reduce their loan portfolio in a recession, so 
as to meet rising capital requirements. The subsequent credit squeeze would add 
to the downturn and further accentuate the cycle, creating an undesired effect on 
bank stability. Thus the management of bank capital buffers that we examine in 





3  Hypotheses and data description 
As our Table 1 indicates, banks hold far more prudential capital than that required 
by the regulators.
4 Capital buffers of banks within the EU15 vary from 1.87 per 
cent of risk-weighted assets in Portugal to 4.79 per cent in Finland with an 
average across the EU15 of 2.93 per cent. Buffers are also substantial in the 
accession countries where they range between 2.64 per cent in Cyprus and 6.99 in 
Malta. The average buffer for the RAMs is around 5.14 per cent which is 
considerably larger than for the other sub-samples. 
  Several reasons have been put forward to explain why banks hold excess 
capital (see for example Marcus, 1984; Berger et al, 1995; Jackson, 1999; Milne 
and Whalley, 2001; Milne, 2004). Banks generally will tend to assess their risks 
differently, for instance via the use of internal economic capital models. 
Appropriate bank-specific capital levels will therefore be set according to varying 
assumptions and levels of assumed risk appetites. Alternatively, banks may 
choose to hold excess capital in order to signal soundness to the market as a 
means to obtain funds quickly and at a lower rate of interest in the event of 
unexpected profitable investment opportunities. 
  Buffer capital can further act as a cushion, absorbing costly unexpected 
shocks, particularly if the financial distress costs from low capital, and the costs of 
accessing new capital quickly, are high. Furthermore, banks may hold capital as a 
security against the violation of the regulatory minimum (Marcus, 1984; Milne 
and Whalley, 2001; Milne, 2004). By holding capital as a buffer, banks’ 
essentially insure themselves against costs related to market discipline or 
supervisory intervention in the event of a violation of the requirements. Finally 
buffer capital may be held in order to take advantage of future ‘growth 
opportunities’. In the event of a substantial increase in loan demand banks with 
relatively little capital may lose market share to those that are well capitalised. 
  In all these explanations buffers of prudential capital provide a cushion for 
absorbing shocks. For banks, the main source of such shocks relate to credit risk, 
principally uncertainty about borrowers ability to repay loans. The term credit risk 
covers both expected as well as unexpected losses. ‘Expected losses’ relate to the 
average anticipated loss likely to be incurred over a period, while ‘unexpected 
losses’ describes the distribution of losses around their expected level. The 
evolution of such risks can essentially be thought to be anti-cyclical in nature 
since during an economic downturn (upturn) the probability of default increases 
(decreases) with the increased volatility of asset returns while the expected loss 
increases (decreases). Similarly, unexpected losses also increase (decrease) during 
a recessionary (expansionary) period. 
                                                 
4 Similarly large capital buffers are also held by US and Asian banks. See for example Peura and 
Jokivuolle (2004) for a tabulation of US capital buffers.  
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  Drawing on this literature, we examine the following null hypothesis: 
 
H0   Under the Basel I Accord, business cycle fluctuations do not have an 
impact on the capital buffers of European banks. 
 
This null hypothesis is compared with two alternative hypotheses (H1): 
 
H1(a)  Banks tend to increase capital relative to regulatory requirements in 
business cycle expansions and reduce capital in business cycle recessions 
ie capital buffers exhibits positive co-movement with the business cycle. 
H1(b)  Banks tend to reduce capital relative to regulatory requirements in 
business cycle expansions and increase capital in business cycle 
recessions ie capital buffers move counter-cyclically. 
 
Both of these alternative hypotheses are consistent with forward looking models 
of bank capital dynamics. Estrella (2004) examines the relationship between 
optimal forward looking capital buffers and deterministic cycles of loan losses. He 
finds that banks, subject to costs of capital adjustment, will build up capital 
buffers in anticipation of loan losses. Since loan losses themselves tend to lag the 
business cycle, this may mean that actual capital buffers are rising during cyclical 
downturns, essentially indicating negative cyclical co-movement. 
  Additionally, banks relying on credit ratings to gain access to capital markets 
may also need to raise their capital holdings to maintain their ratings during an 
economic downturn. For both these reasons banks may increase their desired bank 
capital buffers in economic downturns, hence leading to negative co-movements 
of capital buffers in relation to the cycle (H1(a)). 
  On the other hand, as argued elsewhere in the literature (see among others 
Rajan, 1994; Borio et al, 2001; Crockett, 2001) risks during upturns may actually 
increase. During an economic boom, lenders continue to provide large amounts of 
credit while imbalances that will become responsible for the following recession 
continue to build up, increasing the possibility of unusually large losses. This 
rationale explains why desired capital buffers, as well as actual capital buffers, 
may move together with the cycle. (H1(b)). 
  Our alternative hypothesis H1(b) may also be the consequence of myopic bank 
behaviour. During an economic upturn, when risks are less likely to materialise 
and banks can safely hold less capital, they may underestimate risks and as a 
result expand their loan portfolios. In the subsequent economic downturn when 
risks materialize, the deficient capital buffers may then be unable to absorb shocks 
encountered from the possible rise in the number of write-offs and provisions. 
Banks then may have to resort to reducing their loan portfolio. Such a lack of 
capital build-up or inability to properly account for risks during and an economic 
upswing can be considered as short-sighted bank behaviour.  
15 
  We also need to consider a number of other factors that influence the banks 
desired level of capital. Different banking institutions manage their capital 
differently due to their varying institutional characteristics. Differences that exist 
are largely a result of variations in ownership structures and their access to the 
capital market. A large body of literature examines the impact of different types of 
banks may have on the risk profile of institutions (see among others, Saunders et 
al, 1990; Gorton and Rosen, 1995; Esty, 1997; Salas and Saurina, 2002b). 
  Bank size could additionally play a role in the management of bank capital. 
Generally, unexpected losses can be due to purely random shocks or alternatively 
to asymmetric information in the lender borrower relationship. In the latter case, 
more extensive screening and monitoring of borrowers could increase the banks 
understanding of the risk involved in each project. Screening and monitoring are 
costly, however, and banks probably balance the cost of (and gain from) these 
activities against the cost of excess capital. In the presence of scale economies in 
screening and monitoring, one would expect large banks to substitute relatively 
less of these activities with excess capital. Hence one may find a negative size 
effect on excess capital. This may however be due to a diversification effect as 
well. The argument here being that portfolio diversification will reduce the 
probability of experiencing a large drop in the capital ratio, and that 
diversification generally increases with size. A third argument relates to the ‘too 
big to fail’ hypothesis whereby large banks expect support from the government 
in the event of difficulties, while this is not, to the same degree, expected by small 





To test our hypotheses we make use of an unbalanced panel data set consisting of 
eight years of annual bank balance sheet data obtained from the Bureau Van Dyck 
Bankscope database. Our sample includes data for commercial, savings and co-
operative banks. In total, 468 banks are included in the sample, made up of 364 
EA banks, 427 EU15 banks and 41 banks for the RAMs (the 10 accession 
countries that joined the European Union in 2005). All 25 European Union 
countries are represented in the sample. 
  The largest bank in the samples is BNP Paribas, with total assets of around 
EUR 906 bln at the end of 2004. The smallest bank, Budapest Bank in Hungary, 
has total assets amounting to just around EUR 1.5 million at the end of 2004. The 
distribution of banks in the sample is presented in Table 3, with the largest 
number of banks in France (103 banks) and Spain (70 banks) from the EU15 and 
in Poland (10 banks) for the RAMs. In order to deal with various incidents of 
large fluctuations in the level of the buffers over time, we cleaned the data by  
16 
removing outlier observations of change in capital buffer, identified via graphical 
representation of the sample.
5 
 




















AT 12  8  6  4  22  26 
BE  10   2 2  10  12 
ES  23 3  44 8  62  70 
FI 4    1  1  4  5 
FR 55  42  6  13  90  103 
DE 24  8  2  7  27  34 
GR 12      1  11  12 
IE 11      4  7  11 
IT  30 13  11 10  44  54 
LU  7    1  6  7 
NL 18  1    5  14  19 
PT  8 1  2 3  8  11 
DK  13   2 5  9  15 
SE  3 1  2 5  1  6 
UK  41   1 9  33  42 
CY 5        5  5 
CZ 3        3  3 
EE 2        2  2 
HU 6        6  6 
LAT 4        4  4 
LIT 2        2  2 
MAL 2       2  2 
PL 9    1  5  5  10 
SK  2    1  1  2 
SLOV 5       5  5 
EU25 311  77  80  85  383  468 
EU15 271  77  79  79  348  427 
EA 214  76  74  59  305  364 
DK-SE-UK  57 1  5 20  43  63 
RAM 40  0  1  6 35  41 
 
 
                                                 
5 Only cleaned data is presented in the paper.  
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Our sample is further broken down by bank type distinguishing between 
commercial, co-operative and savings banks. We additionally differentiate 
between ‘small’ and ‘large’ banks by considering the median asset size in 2004 as 
our cut-off point. Here we consequently regard those banks with total assets over 
EUR 37 billion in 2004 as large. The sample distribution across countries, by type 
and size of bank, is presented in Table 3. Here we can see that the RAM sub-
sample is essentially made up of small commercial banks, the exception being a 
single Polish savings bank, Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci Bank. The EU15 and 
EA sub-samples are comprised of around 65 per cent of commercial banks, 15 per 
cent co-operative banks and around 20 per cent savings banks. Sweden has the 
largest percentage of ‘large’ banks (around 50 per cent), followed by Ireland 
(around 35 per cent). In the DK-SE-UK sub-sample 19 per cent of banks are 




Dependent and explanatory variables 
 
Table 1 tabulates average capital buffers in our sample, by time and by country. 
Here the capital buffer is measured as the risk-weighted tier one capital ratio of 
the bank less the minimum requirement of the regulators, as summarised in Table 
2. The individual country averages are obtained by weighting the buffer by the 
market share (total assets) of the individual banks. Interestingly, the data 
highlights several differences that exist in the buffer sizes between countries. 
Many of the smaller countries such as Finland, Belgium and Ireland have large 
buffers, in the region of around 4 per cent when compared to banks in larger 
countries such as France and Italy and the UK, where the buffers are around two 
percent above the required minimum. The individual country buffers further 
highlight the fact that RAM banks on average hold around far more capital than 
banks in the EU15 countries. This becomes more evident when we study the sub-
sample averages additionally presented at the bottom of Table 1. The sub-sample 
figures are calculated as un-weighted averages of the composite countries. 
  Figure 1 plots the evolution of our individual sub-sample capital buffers over 
the last eight years. In the EU15 capital buffers rose slightly between 1998 and 
1999, but then increased substantially between 2002 and 2003. In the RAM 
countries capital buffers have behaved very differently, rising steadily from 1997 
to 1998 before falling sharply between 2000 and 2001. Thereafter, the RAM 
buffer level continues on a slight downward trend and by 2004 is at a similar level 
to the EU15. 
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In Figure 2, we plot the evolution of capital buffers over time, for each sub-
sample we distinguish between different bank types and bank sizes, and 
additionally include the aggregate sample output gap. Here we can see distinct 
differences in the levels of capital held for different banking types for each of the 
sub-samples. In particular, we see that capital buffers of co-operative banks 
behave very differently to those of commercial and savings banks. This is 
unsurprising considering large differences in ownership structure together with 
the fact that commercial and savings banks are profit maximizing. Moreover, the 
difficulty that co-operative banks face in increasing their capital base to match 
growth in business opportunities when compared to commercial and savings 
banks, can additionally affect the behaviour of their buffers over time.
6 We see 
that in the EU15, generally small banks tend to hold higher capital buffers than 
large banks which would be in line with the ‘too big to fail hypothesis’ as well as 
with the notion that smaller banks tend to experience greater difficulty in 
accessing the capital markets. 
 
                                                 
6 Co-oparative banks cannot issue new shares and members prefer cash payments over retained 
earnings because there is no market for their ownership claims.  
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Figure 2.  Capital buffers by bank type and size 
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Table 4 provides definitions of the remaining variables used in our estimation. We 
employ two alternative measures of the business cycle, both constructed using 
GDP data from Eurostat for each of the 25 countries and for the EU25, EU15, 
EA, DKSEUK, and RAM country groupings. Our preferred cyclical indicator is 
the output gap, which we obtained by applying the Hoddrick-Prescott filter to the 
real GDP series. We also investigated the use of the real GDP growth rate as a 
measure of the business cycle. We report results using cycle variables measured 
both for individual countries and at a broader country-grouping level. In this paper  
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we present results for the output gap variables only since the estimates using GDP 
growth differ to only a minor extent. Estimation results with the GDP series are 
available from the authors on request. 
 
Table 4.   Description of variables adopted 
 
Variable Description 
Balance sheet variables 
buf  capital ratio-national regulatory minimum as per table 2 
roe return  on  equity 
risk  ratio of non-performing loans to total loans 
risk2  loan-loss provisions over total assets 
size  log of total assets 
profit  post-tax profit over total assets 
Δloan  annual loan growth 
net loans  loans over total assets 
 
Business and economic cycle variables 
gdp  domestic and sub-sample GDP growth 
output gap  HP filtered real GDP series 
 
 
Our basic specification (model specification 1) includes several additional 
explanatory variables, in order to control for the various costs that are balanced in 
a banks capital management decisions: the cost of holding capital, the cost of 
failure and the cost of capital adjustment. These are the same three costs that 
appear in the theoretical model of bank capital management provided by Estrella 
(2004). The first of these costs relates to the cost of holding capital which is 
expected to be proportional to the level of capital of an operating bank. This cost 
arises because of the greater costs of equity capital funding, relative to deposits or 
debt. Theoretical analysis (see Myers and Majluf, 1984; Campbell, 1979) suggests 
that in the context of information asymmetries, equity is a more costly alternative 
to other bank liabilities. Equity may also be relatively disadvantaged because 
interest payments on debt are deducted from earnings before tax. We include the 
banks return on equity (ROE), the ratio of post-tax earnings to book equity, in 
order to capture the direct costs of remunerating excess capital. We therefore 
expect to observe a negative relationship between the capital buffer and the ROE 
variable. 
  The second cost is the cost of failure. Regulators constantly monitor banks’ 
capital ratios C, ensuring that they do not fall below the regulatory minimum C* 
thus reducing the probability of bankruptcy and the costs associated with failure.
7 
Here, when C  =  C* the bank is faced with the option of recapitalizing or 
liquidating. Higher levels of capital therefore reduce the risk of non-compliance 
                                                 
7 So called losses of failure include the loss of charter value, reputational loss, and the legal costs 
of the bankruptcy process. (see Ancharya, 1996).  
21 
and the subsequent costs of failure which are directly proportional to absolute 
value of the negative net worth of the failing bank (Milne and Whalley, 2001). 
  The actual cost of failure can be considered as the loss of share value times 
the probability of failure. Since a banks’ probability of failure is dependent on its 
risk profile, we proxy the cost of failure by adopting various measures of risk. As 
a first measure, we consider the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans 
(RISK) as per Ayuso et. al (2002). This is an ex post measure of the risks assumed 
by banks and is comparable to other measures adopted in the literature since 
banks with non-performing loans are obliged to make provisions for loan losses. 
We further include an alternative measure for risk as per Stoltz and Wedow 
(2005) and Lindquist (2004) whereby we consider the ratio of new net provisions 
over total assets (RISK2).
8 If banks set their capital in line with the true riskiness 
of their portfolios, then we would expect the relationship here to be positive.
9 
  Size can have a significant impact on a banks’ access to capital, and 
consequent target capital level. Furthermore, the size of a bank may play a role in 
determining the banks’ risk level through its impact on investment opportunities 
and diversification possibilities. We include a SIZE variable which is proxied by 
the natural log of total assets. We might expect larger banks to hold smaller 
capital buffers as per the ‘too-big-to-fail’ hypothesis since they generally expect 
to be ‘bailed-out’ if they are faced with difficulties. Small banks on the other 
hand, might hold larger buffers due to their relative difficulty to access the capital 
markets, in which case the SIZE variable acts as a proxy for adjustment costs 
rather than the cost of failure. 
  The final costs are the costs of adjustment of capital. Considering financing 
under asymmetric information, costs in this sense are incurred when banks are 
forced to make use of external funds to add to existing internal capital (see for 
example Myers and Majluf, 1984). Such a cost mechanism provides motivation 
for holding higher levels of capital as a way of mitigating costs of remuneration. 
If the bank lets its internal funds fall too far, it is faced with the choice between 
cutting highly rewarding investments or incurring high costs of external finance. 
In order to capture these adjustment costs, we include the lagged dependent 
variable BUFt–1. We follow Estrella (2004) by assuming the costs of adjusting 
capital are quadratic. With this specification higher adjustment costs would result 
in a higher coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, signifying a slower speed 
of adjustment. We expect the coefficient to be positively signed. 
  In a further specification (model specification 2) we include some additional 
balance sheet variables, to further control for the determinants of bank capital. 
                                                 
8 As the results for RISK are broadly in line with those obtained for RISK2, we present only those 
for RISK2 since more observations are available for this variable. 
9 Banks may vary significantly in their willingness to take risk. This measure therefore can be 
assumed to uncover information on bank type. Any further idiosyncratic time-invariant component 
in the banks risk profile would be captured by the μ component of the residual term of Equation 2.  
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The size of a banks’ profit can have an effect on bank capital in either a positive 
or a negative fashion but are considered an important source of capital financing, 
affecting the cost of adjustment. Since retained earnings are usually employed as a 
means to increase the capital cushion, a positive relationship would be evident. 
High profits on the other hand can similarly reflect high contract values and hence 
the need to consistently generate high profits. Consequently, capital buffers are 
increased through retained earnings implying a negative relationship between the 
buffer and the generation of profits (see Whalley and Milne, 2001). We therefore 
include post tax profits over total assets a measure of PROFIT with an ambiguous 
anticipated sign. 
  Finally, we further include the level of bank loans (NET LOANS) which acts 
to further reflect the risk profile of the bank since banks themselves could vary 
their capital buffers according to the risk profile of their loan portfolio. A larger 
number of loans with respect to total assets are likelier to reflect a riskier profile; 
the expected sign is therefore positive. We additionally incorporate annual loan 
growth (ΔLOAN) as a proxy for credit demand (Ayuso et al, 2004). Despite this 
variable being the interaction between credit supply and demand, it nevertheless 
serves as a proxy for credit demand since the main potential credit supply 
constraint (the capital requirements) is not binding in our sample. ie capital 
buffers are always positive. Moreover, since an increase in loan supply implies an 
increase in capital requirements, which in a context whereby the adjustment of 
capital (BUFt–1) is costly, is likely to result in an increase in capital buffers. 
 
 
4  Specification and estimation results 
Building on previous literature (see among others Ayuso et al, 2004; Estrella, 
2004), we test the hypotheses detailed in Section 3 through the use of a partial 
adjustment framework whereby we assume that banks aim to hold their respective 




ijt ijt u ) BUF BUF ( BUF + − δ = Δ −  (4.1) 
 
Here i = 1,2,…,N is an index of countries j = 1,2,…,Ji and index of banks within 
each country and t = 1,2,…,
i j T  is the index of time observation for bank j in 
country i. uijt is the error term that can be decomposed as the sum of two 
components, a random country specific component μi, plus a pure bank 
idiosyncratic component εijt. 
  ) BUF ( BUF
*
ijt ijt  is equal to the (optimum) capital buffer of bank i in country j 
at time t. The proportionate adjustment towards the desired capital buffer in each  
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period here is captured by δ. If δ = 1, then adjustment is instantaneous while if 
δ = 0 then there is no adjustment. 
 
*
ijt BUF  however cannot be observed, and is therefore approximated by a 
variety of variables that serve to capture the factors affecting the optimal capital 
structure.
10 The empirical model to be tested therefore becomes 
 
ijt t 1 ijt ijt ijt ijt u CYCLE BUF ) 1 ( KF KK BUF + β + δ − + γ + α = −  (4.2) 
 
Here KKit, KFit and denote the cost of holding capital and the cost of failure as 
discussed in Section 3. The reported coefficients on the lagged dependent variable 
are estimates of 1–δ ie the closer the estimated coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable is to 0 the faster the speed of adjustment. 
  Since we estimate dynamic models, including the lagged endogenous 
variable, we employ the two-step generalized method of moments (GMM) 
procedure of Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator. The methodology assumes no 
autocorrelation in the uijt and uses the entire set of lagged BUFit as instruments. 
We also include two to four lags of our other principal explanatory variables 
(RISK and ROE) as instruments in order to avoid correlation with uijt. The number 
of instruments chosen in each model was the largest possible, for which the 
Sargan J-statistic for over-identification restrictions was still satisfied. We 
additionally apply the Newey-West correction for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent covariances to further adjust the t-values for additional 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
 
 
Estimation results for country groups 
 
We estimate two variations of our model. The results are presented in Table 5 for 
the total EU25 sample and our five sub-sample country groups. Our first model 
(labelled model specification 1) employs ROE, RISK, and SIZE, as controls for 
the costs of capital management. Estimation results are presented with both the 
domestic and the broad cycle (EU25) measures of the output gap. 
 
                                                 
10 For a theoretical derivation and explanation of this model, see Ayuso et al 2004 or Estrella, 
2004.  
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Table 5.   Two-step GMM estimates 
 
 EU25  EU15 
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Note:  Dependent variable is BUFit. Other variables as defined in Table 3. 
  T-values presented in parentheses a(1) and a(2) represent first and second order residual tests. 
  *, **, *** denote significance at the ten, five and one per cent levels of significance respectively. 
 
 
For the case of the EU25, EU15, EA and DK-SE-UK samples, we find a negative 
significant relationship between the capital buffer and each of the output gap 
variables. These findings support our H1(a) hypothesis of negative cyclical co-
movements in capital. The largest effect is seen for the DK-SE-UK sample, where 
the capital buffer decreases on average around 0.75 percentage points on a one 
percentage point rise in the domestic cyclical variable. 
  These findings are broadly in line with previous literature. Ayuso et al (2004) 
Lindqvist (2004) and Stoltz and Wedow (2005) find a similar negative 
relationship between bank buffers and the cycle variables for German, Spanish 
and Norwegian banks respectively. These findings can additionally be compared 
to those of Bikker and Metzemakers who conduct a cross-country analysis of bank 
capital buffers for 29 OECD countries. Their OECD sample can in some respects 
be considered to be similar to our EU25 sample in that it includes both RAM and 
original member state countries. While they do uncover a negative relationship, 
they find that cyclical effects are fairly limited. 
  The RAM sample returns opposite results. Here we find a significant positive 
relationship between the buffer and the cycle variables. This finding is in line with 
our H1(b) hypothesis of pro-cyclicality and would tend to suggest forward-looking 
or prudent bank behaviour. Here we see a significant decrease in the capital buffer  
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variable of 0.03 and 0.50 percentage points for a one percentage point rise in the 
domestic and the broad output gap respectively. 
  The coefficient on ROE, our proxy for the cost of capital, returns a significant 
negative coefficient, as expected, in each of the sub-sample estimations. The 
coefficients are essentially uniform across sub-groups, suggesting that the direct 
effects of such costs on bank capital are similar between European countries. 
  RISK2 (loan loss provisions over total lending) is highly significant and 
positive for four of the five sub-samples. This suggests that banks with relatively 
risky portfolios generally do hold more capital For the case of DK-SE-UK, the 
RISK2 coefficients are negative and significant. This counterintuitive finding is in 
line with some of the other literature in this field (Ayuso et al, 2004; Lindqvist, 
2005). 
  The SIZE coefficients are consistently and significantly negative. This finding 
is as expected and consistent with several explanations of buffer capital. Larger 
banks may hold less capital because they anticipate state support (the ‘too big to 
fail hypothesis’). This finding is also consistent with the presence of scale 
economies in screening and monitoring, ie larger banks are more transparent, can 
access capital markets with less cost, and therefore require less excess capital held 
as insurance against risk. Finally, the negative SIZE coefficient is consistent with 
the notion that smaller banks are less diversified than their larger counterparts and 
therefore hold higher levels of buffer capital. The SIZE coefficients are generally 
uniform across sub-groups with slightly larger coefficients for the RAM countries. 
  Finally, the cost of adjusting capital, captured by the lagged endogenous 
variable, is positive and significant in almost all cases. This finding is in line with 
the view that the costs of capital adjustment are an important explanation of the 
holding of large capital buffers. The coefficients are largely uniform across sub-
samples, which would indicate that the costs of adjustment are largely consistent 
between countries, corresponding to a rate of adjustment towards desired capital 
of around 66 per cent per annum. However we find that the coefficients are 
negative for the DK-SE-UK sub-sample, which is inconsistent with a costly 
adjustment model of bank capital management. 
  Table 5 presents further estimation results for a second model (model 
specification 2), adding several further balance sheet variables to our baseline 
model (model specification 1). Our principal finding here is that the inclusion of 
these additional variables, leaves the relationship between the output gap and bank 
capital buffers largely unchanged. Both the domestic and the broad output gap 
remain negatively related to the buffer variable in the EU25, EU15, EA and DK-
SE-UK sub-samples. The effect continues to be largest for the DK-SE-UK sub-
sample predicting that a one percentage point fall in either the domestic or the 
broad output gap would result in a 0.77 and 0.61 percentage points fall in desired 
capital. Similarly for the RAM banks, the relationship between the capital buffer  
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and the cycle remains positive and significant. These findings confirm the 
robustness of the results obtained via the estimation of the baseline model above. 
  The coefficient on the proxy for the cost of holding capital (ROE) and the 
speed of adjustment (the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable) are also 
broadly unchanged from those reported for model specification 1. The coefficients 
for the RISK proxies are now larger while the coefficient on the SIZE variable is 
smaller and no longer significant. For the DK-SE-UK and RAM sub-samples the 
coefficient has become positive and significant. 
  The new PROFIT variable for all sub-samples is positive and highly 
significant; indicating that retained earnings seem to be used to increase the 
capital cushion. The effect is noticeably larger for the EA sample when compared 
to the other sub-samples. The expected negative sign for the NET LOANS 
variable is found for the EU15, EA and RAM sub-samples, however the 
coefficients are broadly insignificant. The DK-SE-UK sample returns a highly 
significant positive coefficient. Considering the ΔLOAN variable, for all sub-
samples, we find the parameter to be highly significant, with a negative sign as 
expected. This finding suggests that a contemporaneous increase in loan demand 
substantially reduces the capital buffer. 
  We have estimated a variety of other specifications, including subsets of the 
explanatory variables reported in Table 5. In all cases the relationship between the 
capital buffer and the output gap is very similar to that which we report here, and 
hence, for brevity results these results are not reported. 
 
 
Estimation results for sub-groups of types and sizes of banks 
 
Table 6 reports further versions of these estimation results, for sub-groups of 
banks, distinguishing commercial, savings and co-operative banks and also large 
and small banks. We report estimates only for the EA15. This is because the RAM 
sub-sample consists only of small commercial banks and RAM banks appear to 
behave so differently from those in the EA15. Considering commercial and 
savings banks, we find that for savings banks the co-movement with the cycle 
remains negative, but for co-operative banks the relationship is very different with 
a positive relationship evident between the cycle and capital buffers. The results 
for savings banks are more significant than for commercial banks, suggesting that 
the negative relationship reported in Table 5 is largely driven by savings banks. 
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Table 6.   EU15 two-step GMM estimates 
      by type and size of bank 
 








































































































































































































































































Note:  Dependent variable is BUFit. Other variables as defined in Table 3. 
  T-values presented in parentheses a(1) and a(2) represent first and second order residual tests. 
  *, **, *** denote significance at the ten, five and one per cent levels of significance respectively. 
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This finding can help explain the relationship between our results and those of 
other researchers. Stoltz and Wedow (2005) present evidence for German banks 
finding that the relationship between the buffer and the cycle variable is stronger 
for savings banks than it is for co-operatives. The cross-country study of Bikker 
and Metzemakers (2004) finds that the cyclical effects appear to be limited. This 
finding is in line with our results since they focus their estimations on commercial 
banks only. Ayuso et al (2004) consider only savings and commercial banks in 
their study and find a robustly significant negative relationship. Their study does 
not however analyse bank type effects separately. 
  The ROE variable coefficients are very similar to those reported in Table 5. 
The coefficient is noticeably more significant amongst savings banks than it is for 
co-operative or commercial banks. This finding tends to indicate that the cost of 
holding excess capital appears to be most significant for co-operative banks when 
compared to savings and commercial banks. 
  The RISK coefficient remains positive and significant for both commercial 
and co-operative banks in all three sub-samples, while it is negative for savings 
banks. The sizes of the coefficients are notably larger for co-operative banks. The 
SIZE variables are negative and significant for co-operative banks while they are 
largely insignificant for the other bank types. 
  For all three sub-samples, the BUFt-1 variable is positive and highly 
significant for commercial banks, while it is very small (and significant) for 
savings banks and insignificant for co-operative banks. This suggests that 
adjustment costs are most important for commercial banks. 
  Turning to the comparison by bank size, also reported in Table 6, a positive 
and significant relationship appears to exist between the capital buffers of small 
banks and output gap variables, while the relationship is negative and significant 
for large banks. The coefficients on the ROE variable are little changed from 
those obtained for the initial total sample estimations. The coefficients are 
negative and highly significant for both small and large banks. 
  The RISK coefficients remain positive and significant for both small and large 
banks, while the coefficients vary for the SIZE variables. For small banks we find 
positive and significant coefficients, while the coefficients for large banks are 
negative and significant. Taken together these results suggest a hump shaped 
relationship with the largest capital buffers found amongst middle sized banks. 
This is in line with the hypothesis that the very largest banks generally feel 
themselves protected by the government safety net as per the ‘too-big-to-fail’ 
hypothesis. These results warrant further investigation. 
  The estimated cost of adjusting capital (the coefficient on BUFt-1) is 
significant for both large and small banks. The coefficient is somewhat lower for 
small banks suggesting that adjustment costs play a larger role in the case of large 
banks.  
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  To summarise, our estimations by both size and type of bank provide 
evidence that the capital buffers of both small and co-operative banks tend to have 
a positive relationship with the output gap variables. On the other hand we find 






We complete our analysis by examining the presence of individual national 
effects that could arise from various country-specific characteristics relating to the 
legal, regulatory, structural, or tax and accounting framework. A simple way to 
test, and control for these conditions, is to create a country-specific dummy 
variable (Di) for each country. The inclusion of these dummies transforms 
equation (4.2) into the following 
 
()
t ) 1 I ( ) 1 I (








ξ + ξ + + δ − + γ + α =
 (4.3) 
 
As it turns out, there are no significant fixed country dummy variables in our 
regressions, indicating that all the national effects are already captured by our 
chosen specifications. 
  The inclusion of dummy variables however does not allow for dynamic 
analysis and therefore are restrictive in their explicative power. As a further 
robustness check we re-estimate our model, including both the broad and the 
domestic cycle components among the regressors. The idea here is that the 
domestic cycle could capture dynamic national effects that are not depicted by the 
broad EU25 cycle. We would expect this effect to be particularly relevant for 
those countries outside EMU that, in principle, are more likely to have a business 
cycle dynamics different from the core EMU countries. The modified equation 
can now be presented as 
 
() ijt it t 1 ijt ijt ijt
*
ijt u NCYCLE GPCYCLE BUF 1 KF KK BUF + λ + β + δ − + γ + α = −  (4.4) 
 
Where GPCYCLE and CNCYCLE denote the sub-group and the individual 
national cycle variables respectively. We find that for both the DK-SE-UK and 
the RAM samples, we are able to detect significant additional effects from the 
domestic cycle variable, indicating that national effects beyond those captured by 
the individual country dummies exists (Table 7). In the case of the DK-SE-UK 
and the RAM country grouping, we find that both the EU25 and the domestic 
output gap are significant at the five percent level. This suggests that national  
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effects, as captured by the individual country business cycle variables, are 
important for the countries making up the DK-SE-UK and RAM sub-samples. 
These effects appear to have a significant impact on the movements and 
fluctuations of capital buffers of these countries. 
 
Table 7.   Robustness checks: country effects 
 


























































































































Note:  Dependent variable is BUFit. Other variables as defined in Table 3. 
  T-values presented in parentheses. a(1) and a(2) represent first and second order residual tests. 
  *, **, *** denote significance at the ten, five and one per cent levels of significance respectively. 
 
 
We are also concerned with a further econometric problem. Moulton (1990) has 
highlighted a potential problem associated with measuring the effect of market or 
public policy variables on micro units by merging aggregate data with micro 
observations. The problem stems from the possibility that random unobservable 
characteristics within clusters can lead to a downward bias in the estimation of 
standard errors and a subsequent over-statement of statistical significance. In the 
cross-sectional example reported by Moulton, standard errors on aggregate 
variables are biased upwards by a factor of around three. 
  Several methods have been proposed to deal with this problem, the most 
common being ‘robust-cluster’ adjustment of standard errors available in Stata. 
Unfortunately we have been unable to carry out this adjustment, since the 
adjustment is only available for the estimation of a static panel regression with 
random effects. The option to adjust our preferred dynamic fixed-effects 
regression models is not available. We instead present two alternative calculations  
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in order to assess the magnitude of the resulting bias in the standard errors on our 
aggregate cyclical variables. First, following Moulton (1990), we make use of an 
equation for the true covariance matrix in an OLS cross-section containing only 
aggregate group variables (equation (4.4) from Moulton) 
 
() [] ρ − + ′ σ =
− ) 1 m ( 1 X X C
1 2  (4.5) 
 
In this special case the magnitude of the covariance bias depends upon the number 
of observations within each group (m) and the correlation of residuals within 
groups (ρ). As Moulton acknowledges, this formula does not provide an exact 
measure of the bias in standard errors when there are a mixture of aggregate and 
individual regressors, or when the group size varies between groups but ‘it often 
provides a reasonably good numerical approximation’ (Moulton (1990), page 335) 
and indeed he shows that this formula works well for the particular case he 
investigates, a wage regression using cross-sectional data from United States. 
  The applicability of this formula is slightly less obvious in our case, because 
we have (unbalanced) panel data. The ‘groups’ in our case are the individual 
countries j. In our data (see Table 3) the average number of banks in each country 
(ie m in the Moulton formula) ranges between 4 (for the RAM countries) to 21 (in 
SE, DK, UK) and 30 (in the EA). 
  We further assess the extent to which our results are affected by this 
clustering problem by estimating a static random-effects version of our model, 
allowing us to then apply the ‘robust-cluster adjustment’ to the standard errors. 
For purposes of comparison we compare these estimates with those from a static 
fixed-effects version of our model as well as our preferred dynamic fixed effects 
model. 
  We find that for each variable, without the ‘robust cluster adjustment’, the 
standard error in the static regression using either fixed or random effects are very 
similar. We find that using the ‘robust-cluster adjustment’, the standard error 
changes increases by on average by around 20 per cent for each variable within 
each sub-sample. This suggests that, while clustering of errors is an issue for our 
results, it does not totally overturn the significance of our results. 
  Table 8 summarises all these calculations. Column 2 reports estimated within 
group cross-sectional correlation of residuals for the different data sets, in our 
preferred dynamic model. Column 3 reports the corresponding within group 
cross-sectional correlation for residuals from the static regressions (with fixed 
effects). Columns 4, 5 and 6 report the standard errors obtained for the static 
regression using fixed effects, random effects and the ‘robust-cluster’ adjustment 
respectively. The standard errors correspond to the cyclical variable. Column 7 
reports the observed change in the standard error once the ‘robust-cluster’ 
adjustment has been performed. The adjustment of standard errors in the static  
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random effects model is relatively small, ranging from 11 per cent in the RAM to 
27 per cent in the EU25 estimates. The within group residual correlation in the 
three models is similar, suggesting that the required adjustment of standard errors 
in our preferred dynamic model is not radically different. 
 
Table 8.   Robustness checks: 
      within-group correlation summary 
 
   Dynamic  Static 





















Column  #:    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
EU25  19  0.03 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.06  27.59 
EU15  28  0.02 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.07  25.27 
EA  30  0.02 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.08  17.39 
DK-SE-UK 21  0.03  0.04  0.16 0.16 0.13  23.17 
RAM  4  0.04 0.06 0.21 0.21 0.19  11.43 
 








Column #:  (7)  (8) 
EU25 1.72  1.31 
EU15 1.81  1.35 
EA 1.87  1.37 
DK-SE-UK 1.80  1.34 
RAM 1.18  1.09 
Note: The static case refers to results obtained by running the regression without the inclusion of 
the LDV. The dynamic case refers to our equation (4.2). Within-group correlations are 
obtained by calculating an average correlation coefficient of individual bank correlations 
within each country. 
 
 
We additionally report the expected coefficient variance downward bias and the 
standard error downward bias in columns 8 and 9 of Table 8 respectively. They 
show that generally in our samples, the t statistics are on average going to be 
biased upward by a factor of around 1.29. When we multiply this factor by the t 
statistics obtained in Table 5 we find that the change is around 20 to 30 per cent 
for the EU25, EU15, EA and DK-SE-UK sub-samples, while slightly lower, 
around 8 per cent for RAM. This finding is broadly in line with the change that 
we obtained using the ‘cluster-robust’ adjustment reported in Table 8. We 
therefore conclude that our sample is affected to only a small extent by the 





This paper examines the relationship that exists between European bank capital 
buffer fluctuations and business cycle variations over the last eight years. Much of 
the empirical literature in this field has focussed on examining the determinants of 
bank capitalization within a single country. Our research is cross-country and 
centred on the comparison of different sub-sample groups of countries. 
  We build an unbalanced panel of 486 banks, using annual balance sheet data 
between 1997 and 2004. Controlling for various probable determinants of capital 
buffer movements, we analyse the remaining impact that the cycle variables 
appear to have. We find that for the EU25, EU15, EA and DK-SE-UK sub-
samples, a significant negative relationship between the capital buffers of banks 
and the output gap exists. This finding is in line with the existing literature in this 
field and provides further cause for concern relating to the potential ‘pro-cyclical’ 
impact that the introduction of the new Accord will have on the amplification of 
the business cycle. For the RAM banks ie those in the 10 accession countries that 
joined the EU in 2004, our results indicate that capital buffers co-move positively 
with the output gap. The results suggest that the introduction of Basel II might 
have a stronger impact on capital management in the EU15 countries than in the 
RAMs. 
  We further break the sample down, distinguishing between both type and size 
of bank. Our findings indicate that capital buffers of large banks, and of 
commercial and savings banks, appear to behave in a similar fashion to the sample 
as a whole, co-moving negatively with the output gap ie declining in recession. 
On the other hand the capital buffers of small banks and of co-operative banks co-
move positively with the cycle, rising in recession. 
  While these results are striking, they are limited by the restricted data 
available. Furthermore, as indicated by Figure 2, it is apparent that much of the 
buffer movements of the RAM banks has occurred during the first half of the 
sample period. Therefore, when more data on these countries becomes available, 
further research into the degree to which capital buffer decisions of RAMs are 
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Additional country-specific regulatory measures 
EU15 
 
All of the countries in the EU15 sample have chosen to implement the BIS 
minimum of eight per cent as the requirement for internationally active banks. 
However, in addition to this, as discussed below, several countries have 





In Spain, due to the concern of the Banco de Espaňa regarding the ability of 
Spanish banks to keep up with potential credit losses latent in the expansion of 
lending activity, capital requirement regulations were supplemented in June 2000 
by a ‘dynamic provisioning’ system. The idea of the provisioning was based on 
the notion that funds are set against loans outstanding in each accounting time 
period, in line with and estimate of expected long-run losses. Essentially, the idea 
is to build up a provision during good times which is subsequently drawn from 
during bad times. The provision will increase when actual losses for one year are 
lower than expected, and is used against specific provisions in years when losses 
are higher than expected. The provisioning system therefore acts to smooth out 
cyclicality impacts of specific provisions on the profit and loss account. 
  The statistical provision is calculated using a bank’s own internal method
11, or 
alternatively, via a standard method recommended by the Banco de Espaňa. The 
standard method classifies exposures into six different categories, depending on 
their degree of riskiness, and each category is allocated a weight coefficient.
12 The 
total provision is then equal to the sum of the requirements for all six categories. It 
is therefore unsurprising, as seen in Table 1, that the capital buffers of Spanish 
banks have remain relatively unchanged (around 3.6 per cent) since the 
implementation of the dynamic provisioning in June 2000. 
 
United Kingdom 
In addition to the basic requirements set out by the Basel Accord, the UK 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) various additional requirements are 
implemented to assure the safety and soundness of the banking sector. First, sets 
                                                 
11 The regulator must verify that the model adopted characterizes a suitable means to measure and 
manage credit risk. 
12 The coefficients range from 0 for zero risk exposures to 1.5 for high risk exposures.  
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two separate requirements for each bank: a ‘trigger ratio’ and a ‘higher target 
ratio’. The ‘trigger ratio’ serves as a minimum ratio which will generate 
regulatory intervention if infringed. The ‘target ratio’ serves as a warning signal 
and as a cushion of capital acting to prevent the accidental breach of the ‘trigger 
ratio’. The gap between the ‘target’ and the ‘trigger’ ratio acts as a buffer in that 
regulatory pressure is exerted when the capital ratio falls below the ‘target’ but 
drastic regulatory action is only enforced in the event of a violation of the ‘trigger 
ratio’. These ratios are bank specific and are based on the supervisors perception 
of the degree of riskiness of the banking institution. Banks deemed by the 
supervisor to be more (less) risky is required to hold higher (lower) levels of 
capital. Consequently, most UK banks are required to hold capital in excess of 
those specified by the EU directive. For the purpose of our estimations, we 
calculate the capital buffer for UK banks based on an assumed nine per cent 






Banking policy for developing or transition economies generally tends to differ 
from that adopted for more developed markets. Since a stable financial system is 
vital for economic growth, the key questions for policy-makers in this context 
relate to the specific methods of bank regulation and supervision that can 
strengthen financial system regulation and supervision in order to promote more 
efficient and robust financial systems. Considering the largely varying degrees of 
development as well as the distinct differences that exist between the ram 
economies in terms of banking sector structures, it is unsurprising that the 
minimum capital adequacy ratio required of financial market operatives has varied 
across countries throughout our sample period. 
  Table 1 highlights the minimum ratios adopted in each of the ram countries. 
In Estonia and Cyprus, regulatory capital ratios have recently been tightened from 
eight to ten per cent of risk weighted assets to account for changes in market 
structure. In 1997, the Estonian authorities cited rapid growth of banks assets and 
changes in their operational environment as the main reasons for its higher 
regulatory ratio. In 2001, Cyprus raised its capital adequacy ratio to account for 
the increase in securities market activity. Latvia and Lithuania on the other hand 
both recently reduced their required ratios from ten to eight per cent effective 
from January 2005
13. 
                                                 
13 The ten per cent regulatory minimum continues to be effective for AB VB Mortgage Bank in 
Lithuania.  
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  In Poland, while banks are required to hold no more than the eight per cent 
regulatory minimum, 15 per cent is the requisite ratio for banks in their first year 
of operation, and 12.5 per cent in the second year. 
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